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ABSTRACT 
 
QUANTITATIVE EASING: MONEY SUPPLY AND THE COMMODITY PRICES OF 
OIL, GOLD, AND WHEAT 
 
by 
 
Aaron Kasteler, MASTER OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 
Utah State University, 2017 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Dillon Feuz 
Department: Applied Economics 
 
 The recent financial crisis has raised awareness among the public regarding the 
role the Federal Reserve has in the broader economy, primarily as it pertains to overall 
price levels, and especially to commodities. Has the implementation of quantitative 
easing had an effect on underlying commodity prices and, if so, to what degree? 
Specifically, has the rise in the money supply created a subsequent rise in prices that are 
transferred onto the end consumer? This paper surveys the recent empirical evidence of 
the policy of quantitative easing as it relates to the money supply and commodity prices. 
It then uses this evidence to analyze the macroeconomic effect of this policy on such 
prices. It is concluded that this form of quantitative easing has had an impact on overall 
commodity prices and that the long-term results of this policy are as yet undecided. This 
paper ends with a discussion of the potential avenues of research that may be pursued in 
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the future to expand the understanding of money supply and the use of quantitative easing 
as a viable instrument of monetary policy.
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The recent financial crisis has raised the awareness among the public regarding the role 
the Federal Reserve has in the broader economy, primarily as it pertains to overall price 
levels, and especially to commodities. Has the implementation of quantitative easing had 
a positive or negative effect on underlying commodity prices and, if so, to what degree? 
Specifically, has the rise in the money supply created a subsequent rise in prices that are 
transferred onto the end consumer? This paper surveys the recent empirical evidence of 
the policy of quantitative easing as it relates to the money supply and commodity prices. 
It then uses this evidence to analyze the macroeconomic effect of this policy on such 
prices. It is concluded that this form of Quantitative Easing has had an impact on overall 
commodity prices and that the long-term results of this policy are as yet undecided. This 
paper ends with a discussion of the potential avenues of research that may be pursued in 
the future to expand the understanding of money supply and the use of quantitative easing 
as a viable instrument of monetary policy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 has been in effect for over one hundred years. It 
has influenced the policies of this nation as no other piece of legislation has before or 
since. Even though this act is not familiar to most people, the powers that are given by 
the act are felt in almost every economic action that is taken. To help create a foundation 
for this paper, it is beneficial to identify the policies and actions from the past that have 
helped and hindered the economic growth of the nation.   
 The idea of a central bank is one with a long history that is full of both promise 
and potential. Alexander Hamilton himself advocated for a national bank, convinced that 
the only way to foster trade and economic growth in the new nation was by establishing a 
central bank. Hamilton argued that a central bank would provide a standard currency, 
useable in all forms of trade between states. More specifically, a standard currency would 
be less reliant on the gold and silver that foreign countries used to pay for American 
exported goods. This was of primary importance because the use of “hard money” in the 
form of gold and silver kept the money supply inelastic. An inelastic currency had the 
tendency to foment bank runs, especially when the demand for money to be used for 
seasonal needs overcame the local banks’ ability to supply. The only way to increase the 
supply (liquidity) of money was to increase the amount of exports to foreign countries 
that would, in turn, pay with gold and silver. 
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 Thomas Jefferson, on the other hand, famously argued against the formation of a 
central bank. He believed that it was unconstitutional for Congress to create such a bank. 
Article I, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States of America states: “No State 
shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation. . . coin Money; emit Bills of 
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts…”; 
Jefferson was justifiably worried about the temptation for governments to inflate away 
their debt. Nevertheless, the First Bank of the United States was chartered; it remained 
active until the charter expired in 1811. Just after its expiration, the War of 1812 
facilitated a Second Bank of the United States, but the re-chartering of this bank—which 
was supported by Congress—was vetoed vehemently by President Andrew Jackson. 
According to James Forder (2003), Jackson’s opposition to this central bank has three 
main points: economic, political, and social. Economically, Jackson  advocated the use of 
“hard money” – that is, he objected to paper money as a means of payment. Politically, 
Jackson objected to the accumulation of power in institutions that were able to defy the 
government and were not responsible to the people. Jackson’s social objection to a 
central bank was based on his desire to prevent the “rule of a moneyed aristocracy 
systematically exploiting the humble members of society.” This description is very 
effective in outlining the historical opposition towards a central bank, especially as it 
relates to Jackson’s war on the bank (Forder 2003). 
 Many individuals held that a central bank needed to be formed to mitigate some 
of the very crises that had plagued America since its inception. They argued that the 
formation of a central bank would have broad, far reaching benefits. Our nation did not 
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adopt a central bank until 1913, well after the England Central Bank was established, to 
the consternation of some and pleasure of others (Wood 39). 
The first benefit of a central bank would be the creation and use of consistent 
currency across all borders. This would create a more level playing field for businesses 
and individual consumers, as there would be less regional discrepancy in prices based 
purely on differing monetary units. There was extreme difficulty in obtaining financing 
and covering deposits in the early years of the nation; this was exacerbated in certain 
areas of the country, such as the West and the South. Each region had multiple banking 
institutions, and each institution had its own set of deposit notes. Although these notes 
acted as legitimate tender, their value was fluid and based on a wide-ranging set of 
criteria such as reserves status and, most importantly, reputation. Also, these deposit 
notes had almost no recognition beyond a certain geography, and they could not be used 
to store wealth over distances.  
A second benefit of a central bank would be its ability to act as a lender of last 
resort, a sort of bank’s bank. Driving this need was the expanding use of both credit and 
money during the 1800’s and in particular, the seasonal needs of the farming 
communities whose use of money was driven by the agricultural harvests. A regional 
bank would often have insufficient funds on hand to act as both lender and depositor 
when economic circumstances led to “bank runs”; as a result, the local bank would 
inevitably fail (FRB 2011). This unfortunate occurrence could be alleviated with the 
creation of a central bank which would be empowered to lend large quantities to faltering 
banks and mitigate the actual liquidity crisis.  
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Third, as a big, centralized financial institution, the central bank could act as a 
governmental bank. A governmental bank would allow for extremely large transactions 
between countries, facilitate trade, and encourage better international relationships. This 
was made apparent to everyone after the disastrous default of the young United States 
congress on the Continental, basically an IOU issued by the Continental Congress after 
the revolutionary war (de Saint Phalle 43). This laid the groundwork for a government-
sponsored bank; thus, the First Bank of the United States was created. The First Bank, 
with a charter that lasted for 20 years, was a great success, bringing stability to a 
recognized currency, supplying bank accommodation (crisis lending), and providing 
banking supervision. 
The benefits of a central bank were highlighted in the years following the end of 
the charter of the First Bank of the United States. Even though a Second Bank of the 
United States was created, it was plagued by allegations of severe corruption. President 
Jackson withdrew all of the government’s funding from the bank during his second term 
and, on January 8, 1835, Jackson paid off the National Debt. The charter of the Second 
Bank of the United States then expired in 1836. After 1836, when the recharter was 
vetoed, the old problems caused by thousands of different types of bank notes and 
inefficient methods of making payments, transporting and storing wealth, and the like, 
reappeared. At the start of the Civil War, more than 1,600 kinds of bank notes were in 
circulation, and bank note counterfeiting was proliferating (de Saint Phalle 45).  
Between 1836 and 1913, the United States experienced both economic expansion 
and economic hardships, in the form of booms and busts. The final straw that pushed the 
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country inexorably towards creation of a central bank was the Panic of 1907. On October 
22, 1907, the Knickerbocker Trust Company, the third-largest bank in the country, failed. 
Within a few days, the second-largest bank, Trust Company of America, closed its doors 
as well. Fearing that a domino effect would cause many other banks to fail as well, the 
wealthy financier, J.P. Morgan, stepped in and organized the rest of the financial 
community to stand as backers for the banks, thus diffusing the spread of fear and 
financial panic. He was able, in effect, to act as a lender of last resort to the banks 
themselves, and to reassure the public about the safety of their deposits (Hafer 295). The 
Panic of 1907 set into motion a currency and banking reform movement that eventually 
led to the Federal Reserve Act, which was passed and signed into law by President 
Wilson late in 1913. The Federal Reserve Bank (or Federal Reserve) opened for business 
in 1914. The mandates of the Federal Reserve Act are as stated in the Preamble to the 
Act:  
To provide for the establishment of the Federal Reserve Banks, to furnish an 
elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish 
a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other 
purposes.  
This act was in large part a compromise between the banking interests and the 
political necessities of governmental influence.  
 At the inception of the Federal Reserve Bank, there was a large movement to 
enshrine in the Federal Reserve more independence from Wall Street and the banking 
interests. Conversely, there was a need to verify that the Federal Reserve operated under 
6 
 
government control. Notwithstanding the original intents of the framers of this act, it is 
apparent that the Federal Reserve is now almost completely independent of the 
government. Timberlake quotes Lawrence Laughlin  about the desire to keep the Federal 
Reserve independent: 
We must establish some institution wholly free from politics or outside influence 
– as much respected for character and integrity as the Supreme Court – which 
shall be able to use government bonds or selected securities, as a basis for the 
issue of forms of lawful money which could be added to the reserves of the banks. 
This is just one example of the prevalent desire among politicians to maintain a 
politically free central bank. Forder states that “independence was to be independence 
from banking interests, not [from] government” (Forder 297). Did the Federal Reserve 
really ever suffer governmental influence? The government has only the slightest of 
power over the Federal Reserve. The President of the United States can nominate the 
chairman of the board, but that is the extent of executive influence. Congress sustains the 
chairman, and can interview–sometimes interrogate–the chairman of the board, but 
Congress has no power to give the chairman instructions. Where does this leave the 
government’s role? Obviously in a completely superfluous state, one that literally has no 
active control over the functions of the Federal Reserve’s congressional mandate. How 
can we as a nation expect that the duties of the Federal Reserve will be performed with 
the best interests of the American people at heart? This is a valid question, especially 
since there is no governmental oversight to speak of.  
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 What of the Federal Reserve’s role in crisis situations? Has past experience shown 
that the actions of the Federal Reserve are to be lauded or criticized? In 1920-1921, 
shortly after the founding of the Federal Reserve, the country entered into what has come 
to be known as “the forgotten depression” because it was so short lived. When the 
economy went into a contraction, the market was allowed to make the necessary 
corrections; in no time, the economy was back on track. The Keynesian economist Robert 
A. Gordon admitted that “government policy to moderate the depression and speed 
recovery was minimal. The Federal Reserve authorities were largely passive . . . Despite 
the absence of a stimulative government policy, however, recovery was not long delayed” 
(Gordon 22). In this case, when the Federal Reserve allowed the economy to falter and 
subsequently re-allocate resources, the free market did this with surprising effectiveness 
and efficiency. A hands-off policy worked best. 
 What of the Great Depression then? How was the Federal Reserve involved in the 
massive economic contraction that turned into the worst crisis of modern economic 
history? During the 1920’s the Federal Reserve pursued an aggressive policy of inflation. 
Not the inflation of rising consumer prices familiar to most people, but the kind of real 
inflation in the form of an increase in the money supply. Between July 1921 and July 
1929, the money supply increased by 55 percent, or by an average annual rate of 7.3 
percent (Woods 96). The majority of this money did not take the form of additional 
currency in circulation; it came through increased loans to business. These businesses in 
turn used the money to foster growth, albeit an exaggerated growth based on easy credit. 
This policy led to the commencement of the boom-bust cycle, the inevitable crash of the 
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stock market, and the resulting Great Depression. What was the Federal Reserve’s 
response during this period? More stimuli, more easy money, and more inflationary 
interest rate actions. The Great Depression persisted for more than a decade, and nothing 
the Federal Reserve did alleviated the problem, a problem caused in the first place by 
artificially driving down interest rates and fostering an inflationary monetary policy. 
 It is monetary policy that has emerged as one of the strongest levers that the 
Federal Reserve pulls in its management of our economy. The Federal Reserve attempts 
to influence the economy through interest rates and the supply or availability of money 
by setting interest rates. Although the Federal Reserve does not directly determine the 
interest rates that consumers are governed by, they do so indirectly by setting both the 
discount rate and the federal funds rate. The discount rate is the rate at which large 
commercial banks can borrow from the Federal Reserve through the discount window. 
What is important to understand here is that this is a controlled interest rate, which has no 
free-market competition. These rates are determined at the central bank, and even though 
the Federal Reserve takes into consideration the overall state of the economy when 
making rate changes, it is, in fact, leading the economy by adjusting the price, or interest 
rate, banks have to pay to access money. The Federal Reserve can lower interest rates 
when it wants to embark on an expansionary course for the economy. Conversely, when 
the Federal Reserve wants to cool down the markets, it raises the interest rates, which 
invokes more cost to the banks, and less available aggregate money supply to be 
disbursed in the form of loans. This interference in the market has the effect of leading 
the economy. By not allowing for a normal business cycle, the Federal Reserve 
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exaggerates both the peaks and the troughs of that cycle. Austrian Business Cycle 
Theory, forwarded by Ludwig von Mises and expanded upon by Nobel Laureate 
Friedrich von Hayek, stipulates that the artificial price of money (interest) does not allow 
the economy to allocate capitol correctly and efficiently (Woods 74). For example, a 
large exhibition comes to town for the summer, and brings with it tons of people and lots 
of jobs, thereby boosting the local economy. Would the local hotel owner be wise to 
construct additional rental space to accommodate the extra people? Of course not! After 
the show leaves town, the hotelier would be left with an unjustifiably large amount of 
hotel space, and no demand for its use. This is exactly what happens with artificially low 
interest rates. Money (credit) becomes cheap and capital expenditures rise without a 
corresponding real demand for their utility. As a result, the value of the investments 
declines. While the aims of the Federal Reserve are benevolent with regard to interest 
rates, the results are malinvestment and the inevitable decline of the value in these 
investments. 
 The Federal Reserve also controls the money supply using “Open Market 
Operations”; these involve the purchase and sale of assets. It works like this: If the 
Federal Reserve wants to increase the money supply, it purchases $1 billion in bonds 
from a bond dealer, paying for the bonds with a check drawn on itself for $1 billion. This 
money is literally created out of thin air. The bond dealer then takes the check, deposits it 
in the bank, and the reserves of the that bank are then increased. Here’s the catch: thanks 
to the Federal Reserve’s control of the bank reserve requirements, the bank then has the 
ability to lend out additional money as loans through the fractional-reserve rules. These 
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rules say that the bank must maintain a deposit ratio of ten percent, thus allowing the 
bank to lend out ninety percent of all deposits. This process is repeated with other banks 
and other accounts until the initial $1 billion will have supported $9 billion in additional 
lending by the time it is complete. If the Federal Reserve wants to reduce the money 
supply, it does just the opposite: it sells bonds to the banks and the money it receives 
from them—and the further increase in the money supply that the fractional-reserve 
system then created on top of it—are withdrawn from the economy (Woods 121). 
 This is a small snapshot of the role of the Federal Reserve. It is this role of 
adjusting the money supply that this paper focuses on, and especially, on the effect of 
extraordinary measures, currently called quantitative easing, that influence the prices of 
commodities markets. 
 It is this power of controlling the money supply, concentrated at the Federal 
Reserve, that is most worrisome. How can a nation that supposedly believes in the 
principles of freedom and justice relegate the awesome power of our nation’s currency to 
an organization that is not beholden to its people? The Federal Reserve system virtually 
controls the nation’s monetary system, yet it is accountable to no one. It has no budget, it 
is subject to no audit, and no congressional committee oversees, or can truly supervise its 
operations. The independence from banking interests so important at its founding has 
morphed into independence from government oversight instead. The Federal Reserve’s 
efforts to control the money supply by regulating the interest rate regulation and by 
increasing the quantity of money in circulation has not been beneficial to the American 
public. The Federal Reserve took the country completely off the last vestiges of the gold 
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standard in 1971; since then, thanks to the Federal Reserve’s power to monopolize the 
interest rate and to create money out of thin air, the inflation rate has run at greater than 
300%. No United States budget has been balanced since that time, and the end result has 
yet to be determined. How does this in any way benefit the American people? How can it 
be good for the average working citizen if the value of their savings is constantly 
diminished because of excessive money creation? These are important questions, 
notwithstanding that they are completely out of current economic fashion. It is as simple 
as this: Sound money means economic prosperity and limited government. Unsound 
money means inflation and extreme business cycles of boom and bust, manipulated 
further by central banking intervention.  
Objective 
 The object of this research is to determine the impact that changes to the money 
supply have had on commodity prices using commodity price data from the past few 
decades. This study specifically looks at how changes the Federal Reserve Bank makes to 
the money supply impacts three major sectors: Energy, Metals, and Grains. These sectors 
are represented by the commodity price averages of Oil, Gold, and Wheat. 
 To accomplish the above stated objectives, econometrics was used as a tool for 
analysis to help us more accurately understand the relationships that may or may not be 
present between money supply and commodity prices. Specifically, vector autoregression 
(VAR) was applied to the selected data; in addition, a variety of data testing and 
estimation analyses were used to verify the efficacy of the VAR model. Prior to 
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discussing the methods in more detail, a review of the relevant literature will be 
undertaken. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
According to Hossein-Zadeh (2007), quantitative easing (QE) involves the easing 
of credit conditions, or increasing the level of money supply, with the aim of stimulating 
a stagnant economy. Central banks instill a pre-determined quantity of money into the 
commercial banks’ coffers in exchange for their financial assets, primarily comprised of 
government bonds. The subsequent effects of such actions are similar to that of printing 
money. According to Hossein-Zadeh (2007), this is an expansionary monetary policy 
(EMP) that helps in promoting economic recovery. EMP is based on the premise that 
additional funds allocated to the commercial banks’ capital base will allow the banks to 
give new credit to manufacturers and businesses at plausibly low rates. Consequently, 
this encourages firms to borrow funds, expand their operations, and commence hiring 
which, in turn, creates prosperity and growth for the general economy. Rather than 
increasing employment and industrial production, the funds that the Federal Reserve 
pumped into commercial banks’ coffers via the two QE rounds led to more 
financialization of the economy (Pesaran & Smith 2012). This explains the major 
bubbling of certain asset prices related to the previous few years, particularly the 
substantial increase in some share prices and the drastic price increase on several 
essential commodities like wheat, oil, and rice (Cronin & Browne 2007). The QE policy 
has similarly exacerbated wealth and income inequality, both within the US and Europe, 
because it primarily helped the financial experts; no commensurate assistance was 
directed to the public. In this chapter, therefore, I will provide detailed research on how 
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QE affects commodity prices. The chapter will comprehensively review the literature 
regarding how the Federal Reserve Policy (FRP) of releasing huge amounts of money 
into the economy influences the price of commodities.  
 
 Monetary Theory and Money Supply  
An excessive supply of money reduces its value, leading to a situation known as 
inflation. Money supply greatly supports economic activities while also acting as the final 
determinant of inflation and prices. According to Williams (2008), the underlying 
fundamentals that drive an economy also help in lowering prices, thereby triggering 
deflation. Slowing economic activity has the tendency to reduce inflationary pressures 
emerging from strong economic demand. Inflationary pressures can be triggered by 
commodity price distortions, especially in oil; and has increasingly been weakening the 
US dollar while also swelling the growth of the money supply. This was demonstrated in 
the recession experienced between 1973 and 1975 which has, so far, remained the 
deepest stand-alone economic contraction of the post-World War II era. This recession 
involved soaring oil prices following the Arab oil embargo. The drastic economic 
recession also incorporated high inflation (Cronin & Browne 2007). Another recession, 
experienced in 1980, increased the inflation level even higher than the previous economic 
downturn. Oil prices increased substantially during this period and at the same time, the 
money supply experienced a two-fold annual growth rate in the US.  However, inflation 
decreased sharply during the 1981/1982 economic recession that was accompanied by 
declining oil prices and a dollar recovery against other currencies. 
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Williams (2008) observed that the US has not faced any annual Consumer Price 
Index deflation since the mid-1950s, when the prices were minimally lower. Of the nine 
major recessions between the 50’s and today, none was deflationary. In fact, the most 
recent substantial deflation faced by the country happened during the time of the Great 
Depression. Because of the huge numbers of lost deposits and bank failures, there was a 
sharp contraction in the money supply. The value of the US dollar, like gold, is based on 
supply. That supply is strictly limited or controlled. However, the US government has 
technology (the printing press) that allows it to produce as many dollars as it prefers at no 
cost (Evans & Fisher 2011). By increasing the quantity of dollars in circulation, or by 
threatening to do so, the government can reduce the dollar’s value. This, in turn, increases 
the prices of goods and services. Under the paper money system, a determined 
government can always create higher spending, thereby leading to positive inflation. The 
federal government, therefore, has the responsibility, ability, and will to produce as much 
new money as is required to curb deflation within the prices of goods and services 
(Williams 2008).  
 
Unconventional Monetary Policy 
Klyuev et al. (2009) posited that when the rates of interest are almost zero, central 
banks can issue extra monetary stimulus via several complementary channels. Central 
banks can explicitly maintain interest rate policy at low levels until recovery takes place, 
facilitating long-term expectations for interest rates. Monetary authorities similarly can 
offer a broad range of liquidity options to the various financial institutions, enabling them 
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to have resources for lending to consumers and businesses. In addition, central banks can 
seek to influence the long-term interest rate levels in a broad range of financial assets 
without relying on their risk, through reducing the risk-free rates by buying treasury 
securities. Lastly, monetary authorities can directly intervene in specific credit market 
segments through offering loans to non-financial corporations by buying private assets. 
According to Klyuev et al. (2009), monetary authorities could also furnish loans 
associated with the acquisition of private sector assets, just as investors are forced to 
pledge specific kinds of assets to serve as collateral in acquiring loans from a central 
bank.  
Since the initial days of the economic/financial crisis, central banks from 
developed countries have taken resolute actions to improve the liquidity of their financial 
systems. The first response was to radically boost the size of liquidity operations (Evans 
& Fisher 2011). Consequently, this response was followed by actions to widen the 
current operations scope while also introducing novel methods to address particular 
challenges or strains within the economy. Particularly, in efforts to alleviate term 
markets’ strains, central banks expanded their lending operations maturity scope.  
Further, in efforts to counter market fragmentation and the shortage of high-quality 
collateral, the banks increased the amount of eligible collateral for the repurchase 
operations that were employed (Miles et al. 2012).  
Together, policy actions taken by major developed economy central banks have 
played a critical role in reducing the systemic risks and in fostering current improvements 
in risk appetite and market confidence, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
and the bottoming-out within the G-7 economies (Miles et al. 2012). As financial 
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indicators illustrate, some policies have proven more effective than others; central banks 
may be required to make more changes and adjustments if the market conditions regress. 
Furthermore, market developments emphasize the limits within which interventions from 
a central bank can capture the forces of weakening aggregate demand and global de-
leveraging, and indicate that continued and additional public interventions will be 
required to tackle the on-going credit limitations (Klyuev et al. 2009). Forceful monetary 
easing, plus the virtually unlimited liquidity offered by key central banks have facilitated 
the reduction of the extreme financial strain and financial condition tightness which 
existed after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Furthermore, a limited number of 
authorities, such as the Swiss National Bank and the Federal Reserve, were directly 
involved in rescue efforts for particularly big, highly interrelated financial institutions 
known as the “Too Big to Fail” banks. Consequently, the International Monetary Fund’s 
financial strain indices for major developed economies have declined, with some of them 
dropping below Lehman Brothers bankruptcy levels. Feldstein (2011) observed that 
efforts by central banks have helped in minimizing systemic risks, such as the possibility 
of cascading insolvencies within the financial sector. Extensive financial position 
measurements have similarly improved partially because of a substantial decrease in real 
short-term rates. Nevertheless, conditions have remained tight when related to pre-crisis 
levels particularly for some regions and areas where higher real efficient rates of 
exchange and lower market capitalization of equity have offset the decrease in interest 
rates (Feldstein 2011). 
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Monetary Policy and Inflation 
During the 1970s, the US faced volatile and high inflation rates (Garner 1985). 
However, although this rate has recently been diminishing radically, there are still many 
concerns regarding harmful impacts associated with price instability. Shifts in aggregate 
price levels, especially when the shift is not expected, can severely affect the economy. 
Inflation randomly redistributes income while also raising uncertainties concerning future 
prices, thereby resulting in poor allocation of resources and reduced real output (Pesaran 
& Smith 2012). Considering the harmful inflation effects, the Federal Reserve has always 
been engaged in seeking ways of stabilizing aggregate price levels. The Federal Reserve, 
therefore, has recently modified its operating procedures and policy targets to facilitate 
stabilization efforts, focusing more on monetary supply aggregate growth (Pesaran & 
Smith 2012). Nonetheless, some economic experts have suggested that more extensive 
changes should be applied in efforts to limit money creation while also ensuring long-
term price stability. Among the monetary reforms proposed, one would focus on 
developing a stronger connection between commodity prices and money supply growth 
(Garner 1985).  
Many countries have attempted to impose monetary systems, but none have been 
perfect. A monetary system should promote the efficient and smooth functioning of an 
economy. Moreover, money reduces the costs associated with trading services and goods 
because it serves as a medium of exchange (Cronin & Browne 2007). A number of 
monetary system traits are recommendable. To begin with, every monetary system needs 
to ensure a realistic long run stability of the aggregate price level (APL). The value of 
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money is related to its power to purchase goods and services; it is inversely linked to the 
general price levels. Inflation minimizes money’s purchasing power and decreases 
financial assets’ real value. Similarly, inflation leads to uncertainties concerning future 
price levels while also reducing consumers’ willingness to make financial commitments 
for the long term. If the rate of inflation increases rapidly over a short period of time, 
money could lose its overall acceptability as an exchange medium, hence minimizing the 
real economy’s efficiency (Garner 1985).  
Thus, a monetary system has to limit or restrict the growth in the money supply. 
Anzuini et al. (2013) explained that this is primarily because the value of money is based 
eventually on its scarcity as reflected in the conditions of supply and demand. By 
restraining the money supply from increasing more quickly in comparison to what is 
required to facilitate sustained economic growth, a monetary system could ensure that 
money preserves a sensible, stable value. Long-term price stability is similarly promoted 
when people perceive that the growth of money will not be extreme in the future 
(Anzuini et al. 2013). Credible commitments towards price stability among the monetary 
authorities could be helpful in managing economic uncertainties and preventing 
inflationary expectations. An effective monetary system also should never divert 
resources unnecessarily from the real to monetary sector.  
According to Cronin and Browne (2007), every monetary system needs resources 
to operate. However, using resources unnecessarily within a monetary sector minimizes 
the level of goods and services intended for consumers. Further, a monetary system 
should foster short term stability of employment, real output and prices (Cronin & 
Browne 2007). Unpredictable differences in money growth could lead to aggregate 
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output and spending fluctuations. Unless an economy has considerable unemployed 
resources, an increase in spending could result in inflationary pressures while decreased 
spending could result in unemployment plus excess capacity. Minimally, a monetary 
system should never be the reason for aggregate spending disturbances (Cronin & 
Browne 2007).  
The monetary system for the United States is based upon fiat money. Considering 
that there is no internal limit concerning money supply, people hold money up to the 
degree that they can perceive that their account balances retain stable purchasing power. 
In the effort to ensure price stability for the long term, the present monetary system 
demands the Federal Reserve practice restraint on money creation (Garner 1985). 
Although money creation relies somehow on the depository institution’s behavior as well 
as on the non-financial sector’s asset preferences, Federal Reserve policy actions have 
dominated the long-term money supply movements. Schwartz (2003) added that 
monetary authorities should always be aware of the monetary policies being pursued to 
ensure that those policies support asset price inflation. Monetary authorities should be 
aware of any changes in financial institutions’ portfolios induced by asset price inflation. 
Previously, monetary authorities have taken actions in ending asset price booms because 
it served as the root cause for portfolio changes. Monetary policies could be responsible 
for the upswing as well as downswing of asset prices (Garner 1985).  A monetary policy, 
therefore, cannot be held solely responsible for the upswing, but it can be implicated 
within the next price debacle unwinding (Cronin & Browne 2007). 
 
Relationship between Monetary Policy and Commodity Prices 
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According to Bhar and Hamori (2008), the general price level and commodity 
prices tend to be strongly correlated because primary goods are inputs for manufactured 
products; therefore, commodity price changes directly affect the general price level and 
production costs. Similarly, most commodity prices are established in auction markets, 
thereby reflecting supply and demand shocks more quickly when compared to 
manufactured product prices. If a monetary policy’s aim is to promote general price 
stability, commodity price indices can be used in developing policy decisions. 
Considering the close relationship between the general price and the commodity price, 
the rate of inflation can be regulated through attaining commodity price targets (Cronin & 
Browne 2007). Although monetary authorities may not have the power to directly engage 
in the regulation of commodity prices, they can maintain the prices at a certain range 
using open market operations or any other conventional tool of monetary policy.  
The relationship between monetary policy and commodity prices is essential in 
determining how such policies affect commodity prices. According to Bhar and Hamori 
(2008), the commodity price indices should be considered essential information variables 
in the management of monetary policy. Commodity prices serve as the key indicator of 
industrial production and inflation. For this reason, uncertainties in the commodity price 
index signify uncertainties in future consumer price indices. The price of commodities 
can take an information role in the formulation of monetary policy because commodity 
price indices offer information concerning the price and production changes in the future, 
information that is critical in managing monetary policy (Bhar & Hamori 2008). 
Moreover, commodity price increases serve as a symbol for potential economic risk due 
to high inflation. Consequently, monetary authorities can react through tightening money 
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supply (MS) to stop higher inflation (Cronin & Browne 2007). Commodity prices serve 
as alternatives to general price level within an intermediate target plan, which satisfies the 
central bank’s final policy objective. In this case, commodity price indices have to be 
strongly related to the central bank’s policy tools and the general price. However, 
commodity price indices applied as variables for information should only communicate 
valuable information regarding the future shifts in general price level (Garner 1985).  
 
Quantitative Easing and the American Economy 
According to Feldstein (2011), it is undoubtedly true that the United States 
economy rallied strongly towards the completion of 2010. Some of the effects were due 
to the Federal Reserve’s short-term policy, known as quantitative easing. The economic 
recovery, which started within the United States in 2009, was particularly weak until the 
4th quarter of 2010. During the first 3 quarters of 2010, the growth of annual Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) initially was at an average rate of only 2.6%; the largest portion 
of that growth comprised inventory building (Blinder 2010). In the absence of inventory 
investment, the rate of growth would have been at an average of 1%. The last quarter, 
however, was unique; the yearly GDP increased by 3.2%, while the final sales increased 
to 7.1%. 
Feldstein (2011) stated that the major reason for the final sales increase was due 
to increased consumer spending, which grew at the rate of 4.4% and spending rose by 
21%. This implied that the consumer spending growth acceleration was responsible for 
about 100% of GDP increase while the increase in durable goods spending accounted for 
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around 50% of that increase. The increased consumer spending was not a result of higher 
employment or of rapid income growth; rather, it reflected a decrease in the rate of 
personal savings (Feldstein 2011). Household savings had risen from below 2% of net 
incomes in 2007 to 6.3% in 2010 (summer). Nonetheless, the rate of saving declined by 
about 1% to 5.3% in December 2010. A probable reason for this drop in the saving rate 
plus the increase in consumer spending may have been the sharp rise in the stock market 
which increased by 15% in the period between August and December of 2010 (Blinder 
2010).  
 
Inflationary Contraction 
In the present environment, increasing gasoline and oil prices have triggered 
expansive inflation more quickly when compared to the combination of money and 
velocity growth. Consequently, this has worsened the already stagnant and negative 
business environment by offsetting the high inflation with the contraction of economic 
activities. Blinder (2010) stated that this implies that consumers who are already ensnared 
by high gasoline costs have been forced into cutting back their consumption level of non-
essential items. Generally, the expansion of debts and incomes have failed to mitigate the 
high inflation while the inflation-adjusted business activities have been shrinking. 
Hyperinflation results in a great economic depression. The Weimar Republic in pre-
World War II Germany is an example of just how devastating hyperinflation can be 
(Williams 2008). For example, a consumer that visited a restaurant previously had a 
chance of negotiating for a meal and pay in advance since the prices were higher after 
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finishing a meal. Similarly, ordering a glass of wine for dinner would cost more than a 
bottle of wine during the morning hours. Under such situations, prices surge before 
money growth; the velocity of money cannot possibly keep pace with hyperinflation. 
Consequently, basic economic activities collapse.  
Herrera and Hamilton (2001) point out that the recessions that came after the big 
oil shocks in the 70’s were not generated by the oil shocks themselves; they were due, 
rather, to the contractionary response of the Federal Reserve towards inflationary 
concerns partially attributable to oil shocks. Herrera and Hamilton support this analogy, 
stating that if the tendency to increase the federal funds rate had been resisted after an oil 
shock, perhaps the economic decline could have been greatly prevented (2001).  
 
Effects of Monetary Policy on Commodity Prices 
According to Herrera and Hamilton (2001), an increased rate of growth in the 
money supply has two major impacts. Added liquidity minimizes the nominal interest 
rates while more rapid inflation increases the rates of nominal interest. Many economists 
believe that within an unanticipated and modest monetary expansion, the liquidity impact 
of money would dominate (Blinder 2010).  Nevertheless there are substantial 
disagreements concerning the extent of a decrease in nominal interest rate that the 
Federal Reserve can accomplish by way of monetary expansion, or the duration required 
to maintain lower interest rates before secondary impacts would begin overwhelming 
their efforts (Herrera & Hamilton, 2001). Therefore, the ability of a monetary policy to 
divert or avert the contractionary effects of an oil price shock is not great. Oil price 
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shocks seem to have larger effects on the economy, and the feasibility of monetary policy 
implementation that would be required for offsetting even the smallest shocks is not 
convincing. Oil shocks can be said to have a larger impact considering that an oil shock 
does not occur until 3 or 4 quarters following the actual shock. Different monetary 
policies, especially those applied before the oil shocks occurred, may have made a 
significant difference in matters of inflation, even if the claim that the monetary policy 
may have had a limited ability in averting an economic recession (Herrera & Hamilton 
2001).  
Anzuini et al. (2013) observed that the global monetary condition has always been 
thought to contribute greatly to commodity prices. Commodity price developments have 
recently elicited major concerns among policy makers. After commodity prices rapidly 
increased to extraordinary levels during 2008, they suddenly declined during the global 
economic downturn and financial crisis. The commodity prices began to stabilize in 2009 
but they then started taking an upward trend again with fairly high volatility. 
Consideration of monetary policy on commodity prices is, therefore, essential because 
the prices generally, and oil prices in particular, are a critical element influencing the 
consumer price index. According to Anzuini et al. (2013), the evolution of commodity 
prices and the forces driving them are obviously vital in conducting the monetary policy.  
In the past, a broad range of literature has focused on the effects of commodity 
prices, especially oil (macroeconomic variables). However, the literature has given less 
attention to the effects monetary policy changes have on oil, and other, commodity 
prices. Demand and supply factors generally can describe the vastness of the commodity 
price fluctuations. Nonetheless, other forces may sometimes have a role to play. Anzuini 
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et al. (2013) stated that precautionary demand shocks increase the demand for oil due to 
the increased uncertainties concerning the supply shortfalls for the commodity in the 
future. Such factors have facilitated an increased focus on interest rates and monetary 
conditions as potential factors driving commodity prices. For example, the 1970s oil price 
increases are said to have partly been caused by monetary conditions. Interest rates, 
nonetheless, may not totally represent the effects of monetary policy shocks since their 
shifts reflect an endogenous monetary policy reaction towards general developments 
within an economy. According to Anzuini et al. (2013), positive oil prices shocks induce 
a response from the monetary policy that can amplify contractionary impacts associated 
with the oil price shock. Moreover, Anzuini et al. (2013) suggested that loose monetary 
policy plus consistently low interest rates partly contributed to the commodity price hikes 
in effect early in 2008.  
Conventional Monetary Policy Shock: The effect magnitude is not very big 
considering that a monetary policy shock results in a rise of the commodity price index.  
Since the impact of commodity prices is positive and important while the commodity 
price index responds sluggishly, there is an important monetary policy effect on relative 
prices. The effect is normally attributed to the great flexibility of commodity prices in 
relation to prices of other products. According to Anzuini et al. (2013), this may imply 
that commodity price increases occur partly because of increases in short-term inflation 
expectations after a monetary expansion. Cronin and Browne (2007) stated that a 
monetary expansion normally leads to a price increase although the time path and size 
vary substantially. The effect on oil is somewhat sharp, but the effect on food 
commodities remain persistent because the impacts remain important for a considerable 
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period even after a shock. While increases in oil prices and that of other commodities 
participating in the industrial process is spontaneous or intuitive, elaborating food price 
increases such as the price of wheat is more challenging.  
Anzuini et al. (2013) stated that an oil price increase would minimize the global 
food supply via direct effects, and via food commodities land diversion of cropland 
towards biofuels production. According to Anzuini et al. (2013), therefore, monetary 
policy does affect commodity prices. Although monetary policy shocks affect commodity 
prices, the direct impact is not overwhelming. In relation to oil, the impacts are assessed 
based on their effects on inventories, financial activities, and supply in future. 
Nevertheless, a stronger monetary policy impact on commodity prices may go through 
indirect channels related to inflation and economic growth. Further, easing the monetary 
policy to distinguish the real financial crisis effects may push commodity prices up a little 
(Evans & Fisher 2011).  
The channels through which monetary policies exert their impacts on commodity 
prices are economic growth and stronger inflation. Other channels are associated with the 
opportunity cost for real asset investment upon which an expansionary monetary policy 
can lead to an increase in commodity prices. In other words, low interest rates tend to 
decrease the inventories’ opportunity cost, thereby increasing commodities demand 
(Cronin & Browne 2007). Similarly, in matters of supply, low interest rates create an 
incentive that prevent the extraction of exhaustible commodities today, while the cost 
linked to holding inventories underground also declines. Further, a decrease on interest 
rates minimizes the cost of tentative positions, thereby simplifying the bet on assets like 
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commodities within certain conditions. Consequently, this engenders an upward pressure 
upon future prices and spot prices (Anzuini et al. 2013).  
 
US–Effects of Short-Term Real Interest Rates on Real Commodities Prices 
According to Frankel (2006), high interest rates (IRs) minimize demand for the 
storable commodities or raise the supply by increasing incentives for extraction activities 
(e.g., the rate of pumping oil) today instead of tomorrow. Similarly, the incentives 
minimize a company’s need to carry inventories (e.g., oil inventories within tanks) and 
motivates speculators to move out of the commodity future contracts into treasury bills. 
All three mechanisms are essential in facilitating the reduction of commodities’ market 
price. On the other hand, a decrease in interest rates lowers the costs associated with 
transporting inventories and increases commodity prices (Cronin & Browne 2007).  
From a theoretical perspective, a monetary contraction temporarily increases the 
real interest rates, either through an increase in nominal interest rates or a reduction in the 
anticipated inflation, or both. Consequently, the prices for real commodities drop until 
commodities are broadly considered undervalued. The commodities must be undervalued 
enough to raise expectations that future appreciation will be adequate in offsetting the 
high rates of interest. In the long term, the general price level adapts to the money supply 
changes. For this reason, the real supply of money, real commodity prices, and real 
interest rates eventually go back to normal (Frankel 2006). 
During the global economic/financial crisis (GEC), Taylor (2008) observed that 
although the housing boom appeared to be the most conspicuous and noticeable effect 
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linked to the monetary excesses, overall prices gradually increased as well. For example, 
consumer price index inflation was at an average of 3.2% annually from 2003 to 2008, 
which was above the 2% target recommended by the majority of policy makers. Although 
it is often challenging to predict the accurate initial effects of monetary shocks, housing 
was similarly a volatile portion of the 1970s GDP. According to Taylor (2008), this was 
one more period of monetary instability prior to the occurrence of The Great Moderation. 
The monetary policy adopted during this period was beneficial because it kept both the 
inflation rate and the overall economy stable.  
Some economists argue that low interest rates in the period between 2002 and 
2004 were generated in reaction to global factors that went beyond monetary authorities’ 
control. If this was the case, decisions on interest rates by monetary authorities were 
never the key factors that caused the boom. The explanation sounds plausible because 
long-term interest rates during that period remained low for some time even after the 
interest rate of short-term federal funds started rising (Evans & Fisher 2011). This 
different explanation emphasizes global savings, arguing that there was surplus world 
savings (global savings glut) that pushed interest rates downwards within the US and in 
other countries. However, the United States was investing more than it was saving during 
this period. As a result, the positive external savings gap was offset by an equivalent level 
of negative savings gap within the country. No additional effect on global interest rates 
was expected, disputing the existence of a global gap between investment and savings 
(Taylor 2008). 
 During the GEC period, the most noticeable impacts following the reduction of 
the rate of federal funds involved the sharp depreciation of the US dollar and the vast 
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increases in oil prices. In the first year of the GEC, oil prices doubled rising from around 
$70 per barrel in August 2007to $140 per barrel in July 2008. However, the prices 
dropped down as the expectations of the world economic growth tremendously declined 
(Cronin & Browne 2007). After the rate of federal funds was cut, the prices of oil shot up 
from $60 to $70 for every barrel range and continued increasing quickly all through the 
initial year of the crisis. Evidently, this period of high oil costs/prices hit hard on the 
economy while at the same time the gasoline prices skyrocketed. According to Taylor 
(2008), the reduction of interest rates, therefore, contributed greatly in increasing prices 
for oil and that of other commodities, subsequently prolonging the crisis. Preliminary 
evidence shows that low interest rates have a statistically considerable effect over the 
commodity prices beyond the typical impact of the increased demand. Shifts in exchange 
rates similarly seem to affect commodity prices. For instance, International Monetary 
Fund estimations propose that if the dollar had remained at the 2002 peak all through the 
completion of year 2007, the price of oil would have been lower by $25 and the non-fuel 
commodity prices lower by 12% (Cronin & Browne 2007). After it became clear in 2008 
the global economy was going down sharply, oil prices went back to the $60-$70 range. 
However, damage from high oil prices had already been done. 
Effects of the near-zero policy: Roubini (2009) observed that while the US and 
global economies started a modest economic recovery following the synchronized and 
major rally, asset prices disappeared. When asset prices were declining sharply in 2008, 
the economies recovered sharply as the dollar tanked. Risky prices of assets rapidly 
increased in comparison to the macroeconomic fundamentals, such as equities. Roubini 
(2009) found that this was facilitated by the liquidity wave from the near-zero rates of 
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interest and quantitative easing. However, a more significant factor driving this asset 
bubble was the weakness of the US dollar, which had become the core funding currency 
related to carry trades while the central bank maintained the interest rates at record lows. 
Investors that were influencing the US dollar in buying by purchasing, on a highly 
leveraged level, higher yielding assets plus other global assets, had not merely been 
borrowing at zero interest rates in dollar terms (Roubini 2009). Rather, they had been 
borrowing at extremely negative interest rates between -10% -20% annually. Businesses 
were borrowing at the -20% rates in order to invest in highly leveraged platforms of a 
group of risky worldwide assets that had been increasing in price because of excess 
liquidity and the massive carry trade. Individuals’ sensitivity to their aggregate portfolios’ 
VAR (value of risk) should have been rising, due to the increasing risk correlation 
between various asset groups. All such risks are driven by a common monetary policy 
and the carry trade (Taylor 2008). 
Nonetheless, the perceived individual asset groups’ riskiness had been decreasing 
in the same manner as the volatility because of the Federal Reserve’s policy of buying 
everything available (Taylor 2008). By efficiently minimizing the individual asset 
groups’ volatility, thus making them behave in a similar manner, the Federal Reserve 
limited diversification in all markets and lowered the VAR. Therefore, the combined 
impact of central bank policy related to the zero federal funds rate, massive purchasing 
programs, and quantitative easing of the long-term debt instruments appeared to make the 
world safe (Blinder 2010). As the policy nourished the global/international asset bubble, 
similarly it nourished an extra asset bubble in the US. Easy money, credit easing, 
quantitative easing, and massive capital inflows through the forex reserve accumulations 
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by the foreign central banks made funding the fiscal deficits for the US as well as 
nourishing the credit bubble and equity simpler. A weak dollar was advantageous for US 
equities since it resulted in higher growth while also making the profits from foreign 
currencies generated from US corporations operating overseas larger in terms of dollars 
(Taylor 2008).  
The reckless policy of the US that has been feeding the carry trades has forced 
other nations and economies to follow or align with their easy monetary policy (Taylor 
2008). Although quantitative easing and near zero policy rates were already practiced in 
Japan, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Euro Zone, and other developed economies, the 
weakness of the dollar has been increasing the global monetary easing (Blinder 2010). 
Moreover, Latin American and Asian central banks are greatly concerned about this 
dollar weakness. For this reason, their central banks have aggressively been intervening 
in efforts to curb excessive appreciation of their currencies. Consequently, this has helped 
in maintaining the lower short-term rates when compared to the preferred rates. Further, 
central banks may be compelled to reduce their interest rates through domestic/national 
open market operations. Other central banks that have legitimate concerns regarding “hot 
money” pushing up their currencies have been imposing controls or regulations on capital 
inflows. However, the carry-trade bubble will worsen especially if there is no foreign 
currencies appreciation or forex intervention (Blinder 2010). The negative cost of 
borrowing linked to the carry trade will become more negative. If the open market 
operations do not regulate currency appreciation or if an intervention does not occur, the 
resulting domestic monetary easing will foment an asset bubble within such economies. 
For this reason, the perfectly connected bubble in all global asset classes will get larger as 
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time goes by. In the short and medium term, the unraveling may not take place since 
excessive global liquidity and easy money can for a while drive the asset prices higher 
(Roubini 2009).  
 
Conclusion of Literature Review 
The above discussion offers a comprehensive review of literature on monetary policy or 
quantitative easing, as well as its subsequent effects on commodity prices. This review 
provides a theoretical framework under which this study will be conducted. This section 
has described quantitative easing as the act by the monetary authorities to increase/raise 
money supply within an economy in efforts to stimulate a stagnant economy. For this 
reason, central banks place a pre-determined level of money into commercial banks in 
exchange for financial assets like government bonds. According to the above analysis, the 
subsequent effects of increasing the money supply in an economy are similar to those of 
printing money. An expansionary monetary policy regarding money supply is essential 
because it facilitates economic recovery, but it is the careful application of such policy 
that is the central question of this paper.
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The stated purpose of this paper is to take a closer look at the practice of 
quantitative easing as it relates to influencing the prices of certain key commodities, 
specifically Oil, Gold, and Wheat. A few studies have quantified the macro-economic 
movements of prices with regard to money supply using various methods. This paper 
tries to show the associations and results of such manipulations in the money supply as 
they relate to the resultant price of commodities. In doing so, it is important to understand 
some background. 
 
What Is Quantitative Easing? 
The historical definition of quantitative easing is the purchase of financial assets 
such as Treasury and mortgage-backed securities, thereby increasing the money supply. 
Quantitative easing is an extension of the open market operations of the Federal Open 
Market Committee, but it is different because it is used when short-term rates are near 
zero, and its purpose is to affect long-term interest rates. With open market operations, 
policymakers target a specific interest rate; with quantitative easing, policy makers 
instead target a specific size for the balance sheet. (Liborio 2011) 
During the last global economic/financial crisis (GEC) under the great recession, 
the definition quantitative easing was expanded, at least in practice, by the unique and 
unprecedented action of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve now allowed the 
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large-scale purchases of assets across the board, including not only mortgage-backed 
securities, but also lines of direct credit to the Federal Reserve through various means. 
This included directly intervening in international bank failures. It also meant working 
with undercapitalized corporations, and banking and investment institutions (FRB 2011). 
This is not a critique of the various channels and methods employed by the 
Federal Reserve, only an acknowledgement that, during the latest crisis, extraordinary 
and unusual practices were engendered ostensibly because of the dire potential 
circumstances of the global economic structure. 
While quantitative easing can be implemented in several ways, for the purpose of 
this analysis I have chosen to look at the effects of quantitative easing vis a vis the overall 
money supply as calculated in M2. However, it is useful to recall that regardless of the 
method of transmission of monetary policy, the important information here is overall 
money supply. 
 
Money Supply as Calculated by M2 
Money supply can be a very confusing idea; even the term itself can be confusing. 
When used in reference to the Federal Reserve, the term money supply does not refer to 
the total amount of money that might be in circulation. Over the years, the Federal 
Reserve has used three principal monetary aggregates as policy indicators: M1, which 
consists of currency and checkable deposits; M2, which adds a variety of small-
denomination, savings-type instruments issued by banks and other financial 
intermediaries; and M3, which also includes certain large-denomination instruments, 
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such as large certificates of deposit as well as less liquid assets. (The Federal Reserve 
decided to discontinue reporting and monitoring M3 so, as of 2006, M3 is no longer a 
current measure of the monetary supply base.) Since M1 only includes currency and fully 
checkable funds, M1 has traditionally been regarded primarily as a transactions 
aggregate, whereas M2 also contains savings balances (Motley 1988). M2 is a broader 
money classification than M1, mainly because it includes assets, such as money market 
accounts, that are highly liquid, but it does not include cash. For instance, if an individual 
transfers money from a highly liquid money market account to a checking account, the 
M1 total would increase and the M2 figure would remain stable.  
M2 is the most comprehensive and widely accepted calculation and most 
economists prefer using M2 to measure the money supply. The data for M2 that we used 
for this model came from the Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System. We 
accessed the data from their website, which is continuously being updated (see [add 
website address here]). We considered the average monthly measure of M2 from January 
1985 through December of 2013. This was the most consistent and current data available 
across all our model variables, and it gives a clear view of the variations. Because M2 is 
measured in billions of dollars, the data was divided by 100,000 across all data points 
before applying the model. This was done to bring the denominations down to price 
points that are in the range of Oil and Wheat, and to better conceptualize the sheer 
volume of money that we are concerned with.  
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Oil 
One could make the argument that the entire industrial revolution and our modern 
way of life depend upon oil. There have been numerous studies, papers, and so forth all 
investigating oil production and use throughout the economy and world. Reviewing them 
is beyond the scope of this paper. What is included in this study is the actual price of the 
commodity. Given the importance of oil in the markets and as a primary source of energy 
worldwide, a study of the effects from money supply manipulation on price would be 
insufficient without including this key commodity. For this reason, it is included and 
analyzed in the model. The data was a monthly average price, taken from January 1985 
through December 2013. This was compiled using data from the website Forecast.com, 
which in turn gets its information from the Commodities Board of Trade in Chicago, 
Illinois.  
 
Wheat   
 To incorporate a diverse accounting of commodities, Wheat was selected to 
represent food commodities. We chose wheat because it is almost universally accepted as 
a primary foodstuff. Although corn was initially considered, over the last decade it has 
undergone substantial genetic modification and is no longer accepted in certain parts of 
the world due to uncertainty regarding safety. In addition, there is legislation focusing on 
using corn as a (potential) biofuel, thus making it more like an energy commodity than a 
food commodity, and the energy sector was already represented sufficiently by Oil. This 
study looks at US Soft Red Winter Wheat #2, using export pricing at the US Gulf port for 
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prompt or 30-day shipment. This mitigates the potential for long-term storage delivery 
pricing, and accurately captures the current valuation. The data was compiled by the 
World Bank (see http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/commodity-price-data). For 
continuity and validity, we applied the average monthly price of wheat from January 
1985 through December 2013. The unit of measure is US dollars per metric ton.   
 
Gold 
 Finally, Gold was chosen as a measure of the metals side of commodities. 
Regardless of the historical role that gold has played as actual money, the price of the 
yellow metal needed to be included because of its industrial significance and its 
popularity with consumers. In addition, gold has broad public appeal in times of 
economic crisis. Financial writers cite a variety of factors that influence gold price 
movements. Typically, they view the price of gold as a barometer of economic and 
political instability. Left unexplained, however, is the mechanism which allows gold 
prices to foreshadow changes in the rate of inflation, governmental stability, etc. (Abken 
1980). Our primary use is the actual averaged monthly price of gold. The data was 
compiled using information from the website goldprice.com. The data was corroborated 
by information from the London Bullion Market Association. All data is based on the 
dollars per ounce trading measurement and averaged over a month’s time frame, in the 
same 1985-2013 span. 
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Analysis Method 
The method of analysis chosen to investigate our objective is called a vector 
autoregressive model or VAR for short (Sims 1980). This is an econometric method of 
analysis that is used to capture the linear interdependencies among multiple time series of 
data. For this paper, we are focusing on the potential relationships between M2, Oil, 
Gold, and Wheat, using average monthly commodity pricing data as well as overall 
monthly money supply. With this study, we will attempt to identify, in a real-world sense, 
what effect–if any–an increase in money supply has upon the prices of three key 
commodities, namely Oil, Gold, and Wheat.  
Vector autoregressive processes are a suitable model class for describing the data 
generation process of a small or moderate set of time series variables (Lütkepohl & 
Krätzig 2004) which is what this study is investigating; they are also suitable for 
determining relationships among the variables, if any, over a given period of time. As 
mentioned by Kirchgässner et al. (2012), all variables in these models may be treated as 
being a priori endogenous; allowance can then be made for rich dynamics. Restrictions 
are usually imposed with statistical techniques instead of priori beliefs based on 
theoretical considerations, which can be uncertain. Special features of the data 
generation, such as seasonality, structural shifts, and trends are sometimes present in 
economic time series and have to be considered when their data generation processes are 
being modelled. Trends, in particular, have attracted considerable attention. If several 
variables in the model are driven by a strong stochastic trend, there may be a substantially 
strong link that would be of interest to define or acknowledge from an economic point of 
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view (Kirchgässner et al. 2012). Following Granger and Engle (1987), the variables are 
called co-integrated if they have a common stochastic trend. For this section, I will 
introduce the basic vector autoregressive and error correction models, neglecting 
deterministic terms and exogenous variables.  
 
The VAR Model 
For a set of 𝐾 time series or variables yt = (y1t …,ykt), a VAR model identifies 
their dynamic interactions, i.e., relationships. The basic model of order p (VAR(p)) has 
the form: 
 
𝒚𝑡 = 𝑨1𝒚𝑡−1 + ⋯ 𝑨𝑝𝒚𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑼𝑡 
 
where the Ap’s are (k x k) coefficient matrices and Ut = (U1t……, UKt)’ is (𝑘 𝑥 1) vector 
of unobservable terms. This latter is usually assumed to be a zero-mean independent 
white noise process with time-invariant, positive definite covariance matrix Ε(UtUt’) = 
∑U. In other words, the Ut’s are independent stochastic vectors with Ut ~ (0, ∑U). The 
process is stable if: det(IK  –  A1z  –   . . .  –  APzp)  ≠  0 for |z|  ≤  1.   That is, the 
polynomial defined by the determinant of the autoregressive operator has no roots in and 
on the complex unit circle. On the assumption that the process has been initiated in the 
infinite past (t = 0, ± 1, ± 2, . . .), it generates stationary time series that have time-
invariant means, variances, and covariance structure. If the polynomial has unit root (i.e., 
the determinant is zero for z = 1), then some or all of the variables are integrated. If the 
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variables have a common stochastic trend, it is possible that there are linear combinations 
of them that are I(0), or integrated of order zero. In that case, they are co-integrated. In 
other words, a set of I(1) variables (i.e., variables that have a unit root, but after 1st 
differencing are stationary) is called co-integrated if a linear combination exists that is 
I(0). Occasionally with a VAR model, it is convenient to consider systems with both I(1) 
and I(0) variables. In this case, the concept of co-integration is extended by calling any 
linear combination that is I(0) a co-integration relation, or more simply, just co-integrated 
(Lütkepohl & Krätzig 2004).  Co-integration and its implications are discussed in more 
detail Chapter 4, “Results.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS  
 
To determine the impact of quantitative easing on commodity prices, we used the 
VAR model described in the prior chapter. When we estimated the model, it showed that 
each variable is dependent on certain significant lag periods of its own, and the other 
variables (Table 1 shows estimated parameter results for lags of M2). 
 
Table 1: VAR Parameter Estimates for Lags of M2 
  Gold Oil Wheat M2 
t-1   2.92602*** -0.52596 0.0272 1.19745*** 
t-2   -5.07748*** 0.30924 -1.25771** -0.19775** 
t-3   2.19549* 2.13061 1.45331** 0.15421 
t-4   -2.00941 -3.81705** 0.1174 -0.31793*** 
t-5   2.75727** 3.4231* -0.64711 0.32769*** 
t-6   -0.03436 -2.8954 1.09497 -0.0499 
t-7   -1.26531 2.72478 -1.57937** -0.14553 
t-8   0.2429 -1.26183 0.72044 0.12836 
t-9   -1.6564 -1.48242 -0.82244 -0.04999 
t-10   3.0221** 2.54689 1.29479** -0.00223 
t-11   -2.49605* -0.4613 -0.44439 -0.1648 
t-12   1.41597* -0.63992 0.06734 0.1223* 
 
t-1 thru t-12 represents the lag periods.  
*** 1% significance level ** 5% significance level * 10% significance level 
 
In the estimation we chose 12 time-lagged periods, as is common in the oil 
literature (e.g., Killian 2009). With monthly data, our lag structure captures one year of 
dynamics, which indicates being sufficient to eliminate any autocorrelation of residuals. 
Variable at t 
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The parameter estimates show that each variable is dependent on certain significant lags. 
Gold is dependent on lagged periods t-1, t-2, t-5, and t-10 of the variable M2. Oil is 
dependent only on lagged periods t-4 and t-5 of the variable M2. Wheat is dependent on 
lagged periods t-2, t-3, and t-7 of the variable M2. Lastly, M2 is dependent on lagged 
periods t-1, t-2, t-4, and t-5 of variable M2 (see Appendix: “VAR Significance Results”). 
 After obtaining this estimation, the residuals were tested for auto-correlation and 
cross-correlation as well, as seen in Table 2. 
  
Table 2: VAR Test for Autocorrelation of Residuals 
 
 
AR1 AR2 AR3 AR4 
F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F F Value Pr > F 
Gold 0.01 0.9139 0.03 0.9735 0.61 0.6117 0.5 0.7385 
M2 0.07 0.7952 0.04 0.9616 0.12 0.9506 0.37 0.8271 
oil 0.02 0.8892 0.04 0.9615 0.03 0.9924 0.08 0.9882 
wheat 0.01 0.9361 0.01 0.9916 0.01 0.9993 0.03 0.9984 
 
*p values (Pr > F) for all variables are higher than 5% critical threshold, i.e., no auto-correlation. 
 
Because Table 3 shows that there is no cross-correlation of the residuals., and no auto-
correlation was demonstrated in Table 2, we can accept the estimation given the initial 
number of lags. Sometimes only an auto-correlation test is used to stipulate correlation, 
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but this test alone may not be adequate to identify cross-correlation, hence the secondary 
test of the residuals (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Cross-Correlation of Residuals Test 
 
Schematic Representation of Cross-Correlations of Residuals 
Variable/Laga 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Gold ++.. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
M2 ++-. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
oil .-+. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
wheat ...+ .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
aAny lag with four “….” indicates no cross-correlation. 
 
 Because we have decided to use a VAR model, we need to be confident of 
whether the data is of stationary or non-stationary nature. The VAR model usually 
considers stationary series data (Lütkepohl & Krätzig 2004). It is also possible to estimate 
a model with non-stationary data using a VAR. However, when non-stationary data is 
applied, it can engender difficult econometric questions, in particular because 
differencing the data to achieve the desired stationarity can introduce distortions into the 
multivariate models, which will contaminate the estimation, and yield unsupported results 
(Fanchon & Wendel 1992).  
So, a first relevant consideration is to determine whether the data is of stationary 
or non-stationary nature, i.e., we determine whether or not our variables have a unit root 
(non-stationary) or not. We chose to apply a Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test, a unit root 
test used in time series analysis to test the null hypothesis that time series data is 
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integrated of order one or higher, i.e., it requires a minimum number of differences to 
obtain a stationary series (Phillips-Perron 1988). In this test, the null hypothesis is that the 
series has a unit root, otherwise known as non-stationary (Tables 4–7). 
Table 4: Phillips Perron Unit Root Test for Gold 
Type Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau 
Zero Mean 3 1.0522 0.9202 1.2184 0.9433 
Single Mean 3 -0.0553 0.9543 -0.0373 0.9536 
Trend 3 -2.4229 0.9579 -1.1425 0.9192 
 
Table 5: Phillips Perron Unit Root Test for M2 
 Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau 
Zero Mean 3 1.7105 0.9789 17.718 1 
Single Mean 3 2.0854 0.9981 8.9678 1 
Trend 3 2.0656 0.9998 2.5058 1 
 
Table 6: Phillips Perron Unit Root Test for Oil 
 Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau 
Zero Mean 3 -1.1803 0.4427 -0.4826 0.5056 
Single Mean 3 -7.2904 0.2549 -1.7201 0.4201 
Trend 3 -30.741 0.0061 -4.0925 0.0071 
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Table 7: Phillips Perron Unit Root Test for Wheat 
 Lags Rho Pr < Rho Tau Pr < Tau 
Zero Mean 3 -0.611 0.5461 -0.3623 0.5535 
Single Mean 3 -9.7716 0.1402 -2.0774 0.2537 
Trend 3 -18.608 0.0881 -3.0909 0.1102 
 
The results of the Phillips Perron test show that we are dealing with non-
stationary data, given the p value (Pr<Tau) is larger than 5% in all single mean cases and 
almost all trend cases; the exception in the latter is oil. Since unit root data is not ideal for 
a VAR model, it was decided to validate these results using a Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. Application of the KPSS test is intended to complement the 
Phillips-Perron unit root test. KPSS tests the null hypothesis that an observable series is 
stationary around a deterministic trend, or trend stationary (Kwiatkowski Phillips et al. 
1992). This allows us to test both the unit root hypothesis and the stationary hypothesis in 
each series of data.  
 
Table 8: KPSS on Gold 
Type Lags Eta Pr > Eta 
Single Mean 16 1.2354 0.0006 
Trend 16 0.4475 0.0002 
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Table 9: KPSS on M2 
Type Lags Eta Pr > Eta 
Single Mean 16 2.0239 <.0001 
Trend 16 0.519 0.0001 
 
Table 10: KPSS on Oil 
Type Lags Eta Pr > Eta 
Single Mean 16 1.6851 0.0002 
Trend 16 0.4457 0.0002 
 
Table 11: KPSS on Wheat 
Type Lags Eta Pr > Eta 
Single Mean 16 1.0917 0.0016 
Trend 16 0.3176 0.0008 
 
 
The results of the KPSS test were consistent with the Phillips-Perron test, 
indicating non-stationary data across all variables (Tables 8–11). 
We have now identified that across this time series of data, we are generally 
dealing with non-stationary data. As previously noted, there can be problems with VAR 
modeling if you are applying data that is non-stationary. When non-stationary data is 
utilized, one of the issues to identify is co-integration. Co-integration implies a long-run 
equilibrium relationship, with departures from this relationship triggering forces pushing 
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the variables back towards equilibrium (Fanchon & Wendel 1992). In our VAR model, 
we have tested and determined that we have non-stationary variables. A non-stationary 
variable tends to wander extensively, but some pairs of non-stationary variables can be 
expected to wander in such a way that they do not drift too far apart. In the short term, 
and with narrow perspective, these variables can appear to be random. However, in the 
longer term and taken as a whole of the time series, these variables can be said to move 
as if directed by the relationship, i.e., a pattern of movement can be evident (Lütkepohl & 
Krätzig 2004). This is called co-integration. We look for co-integration in our model 
specifically because we know that we have non-stationary data. Testing for co-integration 
is done using the Johansen test.  
The Johansen test is a procedure for testing co-integration of several time series. 
The benefit of this test is that it permits us to identify if there are one or more co-
integrated relationships among the variables, meaning that there can be one or several co-
integrated terms among the time series variables from our data (Davidson 2010). Table 
12 indicates the results from the co-integration test, where the 1st null hypothesis is of no 
co-integration term (i.e., r = 0) versus more than no co-integration term (i.e., r=1). The 
2nd null hypothesis is of one co-integration term (i.e., r=1) versus more than one co-
integration term (i.e., r=2), etc. Because the 5% Critical Value of 12.21 is higher than the 
trace amount of 9.27 at the rank (r) of 2, we therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that there are two co-integration terms among the variables. 
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Table 12: Johansen Test for Co-Integration, Lag 12 
Hoa: 
 
Rank=r 
H1: 
 
Rank>r Eigenvalue Trace 
5% Critical 
Value 
Drift in 
ECM 
Drift in 
Process 
0 0 0.0774 51.7055 39.71 NOINT Constant 
1 1 0.0447 24.6271 24.08   
2 2 0.0209 9.2753 12.21   
a Co-integration rank test using trace 
 
Notwithstanding the prior mentioned limitations from modeling a VAR with 
differenced data,1 the asymptotic distribution theory developed by Phillips and Durlauf 
(1986), Stock (1987), West (1988), and Sims et al. (1990) shows that OLS provides 
consistent VAR parameter estimates for non-stationary explanatory variables that are co-
integrated. Thus, they prove that a straightforward estimation of a VAR model with raw 
(non-stationary) data is therefore appropriate for data which is both integrated of order 1 
and co-integrated (Fanchon & Wendel 1992). So, on the basis of a positive identification 
of co-integration terms, and prior unit root series, it is determined that a VAR model will 
yield a proper estimation with level data.  
As mentioned previously, when VAR models are estimated with data that is both 
non-stationary and not co-integrated, it can raise difficult econometric questions– 
specifically because differencing to achieve stationarity can introduce distortions into the 
multivariate VAR model (Fanchon & Wendel 1992). However, VAR models can be 
estimated with raw data in levels if the non-stationary data is also co-integrated, because 
                                                          
1 In order to obtain stationarity for unit-root data. 
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theoretical work proves that estimation with such data will yield consistent parameter 
estimates, as we did with our VAR model. In the case of our original model, because of 
the Johansen test identifies two co-integration terms, we further explored the relationship 
between these terms and the variables. We chose to do this using a secondary model, 
called a vector error correction (VEC) model. The primary addition to the VEC model is 
that it differences the data to achieve stationarity and then uses an error correction term to 
replace the long-run information lost through that differencing. We thus approached this 
study by estimating two models: a VAR model, and a VEC model.  
The VEC model is estimated using differenced stationary data. The VEC model is 
distinguished from the VAR model primarily by the inclusion of an error correction term, 
which represents departures from the long-run equilibrium relationship between co-
integrated variables. This error correction term is the residual series of the co-integration 
equation. 
 
VEC Model 
 The VECM model is obtained from the VAR model by subtracting the yt-1 from 
both sides and then rearranging the terms. Because ∆yt does not contain stochastic trends 
by our assumption that all variables can be at most I(1), the term Πyt-1 is the only one that 
includes I(1) variables. Hence, Πyt-1 must also be I(0), and it contains the co-integrating 
relations. The model takes this mathematical form: 
  
𝛥𝒚𝑡 =  𝜫𝒚𝑡−1 + 𝜞1∆𝒚𝑡−1+ .  .  . + 𝜞𝑝−1∆𝒚𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝒖𝑡 
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 Where ∆𝒚𝑡 is yt – yt-1, Γ is a (K x K) matrix akin to the VAR model, and Π is also 
a (K x K) matrix of rank r. The estimation of the VEC model looks like this in Table 13:  
 
Table 13: VECM Parameter Estimates for Lags of M2 
 
 
 Gold Oil Wheat M2 
t-1 0.0091 0.0391 0.0252 0.0022 
t-2 2.8375*** -0.6000 -0.0106 0.1988*** 
t-3 -2.3101*** -0.3692 -1.2603*** 0.0026 
t-4 -0.0660 1.8103* 0.1897 0.1556*** 
t-5 -2.0741*** -2.0195* 0.3126 -0.1629*** 
t-6 0.7394 1.4826 -0.3474 0.1641** 
t-7 0.7087 -1.4105 0.7479* 0.1141* 
t-8 -0.5819 1.2896 -0.8300** -0.0308 
t-9 -0.2958 0.0579 -0.1072 0.0960 
t-10 -1.9959*** -1.4739 -0.9245** 0.0470 
t-11 1.0825 1.1395 0.3626 0.0436 
t-12 -1.4771** 0.6083 -0.0751 -0.1197* 
 
t-1 thru t-12 represents the lag periods.  
*** 1% significance level ** 5% significance level * 10% significance level 
 
 
When we incorporate the error correction term in the VEC model, we get results 
that are both significant and consistent with the initial model, and that only show 
variation as the time period increases. This is what you would expect, and precisely the 
reason the error correction term is included–to mitigate for that difference. 
Finally, we can take the total of the VECM parameter estimation, and formulate 
the concluding results of the models. The figures in Table 14 show evidence in support of 
Variable at t 
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our hypothesis of this study, that is, that there is an effect from M2 on our chosen 
commodities. The table shows the Error Correction term estimation results, incorporating 
the data generated from the initially estimated VAR. Here, the Alpha parameter is the 
short-run adjustment, and the Beta parameter is the long-run adjustment of our estimated 
Error Correction term Π. So, taken together they represent the interactions of the short 
run and long run adjustment coefficients. Table 14 incorporates all estimated parameters.2  
 
Table 14: Parameter Alpha * Beta' Estimates (∏) 
Variable Gold Oil Wheat M2 
Gold -0.00747 0.02116 -0.0013 .00910 
M2 -0.00055 0.00195 -0.0025 .00219 
Oil 0.02119 -0.0428 -0.0974 .03911 
Wheat 0.00646 -0.0096 -0.0503 .02520 
*Last Column: All positive signs and increasing percentages over the time series. 
 
 This table shows that in the long run, considering the estimated data from January 
1985 to December 2013, a positive relationship is identified between the amount of 
money supply (M2) and the price of Gold in the amount of .0091. It is not very large, but 
still noticeable. It likewise shows that there has been a positive long-term relationship 
between the amount of M2 and the price of Oil at .0391 which is the highest among the 
three. Lastly, it shows there has also been a positive long-term relationship between the 
                                                          
2 Not just those of lagged M2 parameters, as in results of prior Tables 1 and 13. 
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amount of M2 and the price of Wheat at .0252. These positive long-term relationships, 
determined through the error correction term for non-stationary data, show that although 
each series may ‘wander off’ by itself, there still is a positive long-term equilibrium 
relationship among them. Thus, as one increases, in the long run the other will also 
necessarily increase.
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objective of this research was to determine if changes to the money supply, as 
measured by M2, impacted commodity prices, specifically the price of Gold, Oil and 
Wheat. Monthly data from January 1985 to December 2013 were used for the analysis. A 
vector auto regressive (VAR) model and a vector error correction (VEC) model were 
used to analyze the data.  
After applying both the VAR and the VEC models to our data and using the SAS 
computational program, we find a long-term relationship equilibrium between the prices 
of Gold, Oil, and Wheat commodities and the amount of M2. While there is a definite 
effect upon the underlying pricing of the three commodities, it is not as pronounced as 
one would have expected, especially given the strength of the quantitative easing 
program. The underlying impression here is that the Federal Reserve did anticipate 
correctly the potential short-term effects upon pricing with these several commodities. 
And given the potential serious economic repercussions that were being postulated at the 
time, the course of quantitative easing was potentially the least painful. So far, the 
economic recovery that we are seeing has borne out the effectiveness of their policy. 
That is in the short-term view of things. Longer term, the consequences of such a 
large amount of monetary intervention cannot be completely understood. Given the sheer 
amount of money that was introduced into the economic system, and being that it was 
unprecedented in both size and scope, there may yet be unknown consequences for this 
policy. In the beginning of the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve took actions that were 
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not mirrored across the globe immediately. The European Central Bank also responded 
with its own programs of quantitative easing. However, in the end, central banks from 
almost all major world economies found it necessary to follow the actions of the Federal 
Reserve, and embark on their own policies of economic support. 
There are several potential avenues of study that would be beneficial to build 
upon this research. I think the most relevant one relates to the interest rates. As noted 
earlier, one of the primary methods that the Federal Reserve uses to implement monetary 
policy is through interest rate modification. The past several years have been 
unprecedented with the interest rate being kept essentially at zero and the policy of 
quantitative easing being followed. While the interest rate’s influence on commodity 
prices has been studied several times, a model that would incorporate this influence in an 
accurate matter as well as account for M2 changes and its relationship to commodity 
prices would be of interest. Another avenue of research would be to build upon this 
paper, and look more broadly at the food sector of the economy. Wheat was the food 
sector representative with this paper, but a researcher could focus entirely upon just that 
sector, incorporating the changes of all food sector commodities. This paper found that 
the most pronounced effect was upon Oil, but Wheat was not far behind. As the global 
food supply chain increases its integration and dependence, a marked manipulation of 
pricing on the food sector would have severe effects upon the bulk of the global 
population, especially upon third-world nations. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Chart 1: Graphical Representation of M2, Combined with Gold, Oil, and Wheat 
 
 
 
This graph gives an overview of the motion of the respective commodity prices of Gold, 
Oil, and Wheat from the periods of January 1985 thru December 2013. Overlaid with an 
M2 chart showing the actual trend only, as the amount of M2 is calculated in trillions of 
dollars. For this chart, we divided the M2 amount by 10 Billion, for ease of comparison. 
The left-hand amounts are in actual dollar ($) amounts – except, of course, the M2, which 
would have been multiplied by 10 billion.  
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Chart 2: Aggregate M2 Data 1985-2013 
 
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1985 2333.7 2348.2 2361.2 2372.5 2384.5 2406.3 2427.9 2438.9 2449.5 2464.8 2473.8 2490.2 
1986 2504 2512.3 2535.3 2560.7 2583.9 2608.9 2632.7 2649.7 2670 2689 2701 2725.4 
1987 2748.6 2743.1 2751.5 2766.7 2768 2773.5 2779.3 2784.7 2793.6 2812.3 2819.8 2827.3 
1988 2844.4 2871.1 2895 2914.1 2925.5 2944 2953.7 2961.1 2963.8 2969.9 2986.2 2991.1 
1989 2995.6 2989.4 3001.2 3006.1 3008.4 3024.4 3051.4 3072.4 3086.3 3112.5 3133.9 3150.9 
1990 3166.5 3181.2 3190.9 3202.3 3201.9 3212.6 3225.4 3241.9 3253.8 3260.9 3264.1 3271.1 
1991 3287.2 3303.4 3319 3332.3 3343 3349 3356.6 3354.9 3354.4 3359.6 3363.7 3371.5 
1992 3378.1 3397.8 3402.6 3398.8 3397.8 3393.1 3392.8 3396.7 3408.7 3420.5 3425.6 3423.6 
1993 3416.5 3411.8 3409.3 3406.8 3434.1 3441 3439.3 3443.3 3449.9 3452.4 3466.9 3473.5 
1994 3471.5 3473.2 3478.2 3479.6 3490.7 3479.4 3485.7 3486.1 3485.6 3482.7 3485.9 3486.4 
1995 3488.7 3487.8 3489.5 3492.4 3518.3 3545.3 3562.9 3585.5 3598 3609.1 3616.8 3624.2 
1996 3642.6 3655.8 3681.9 3693.7 3704.8 3715.9 3732 3741 3747.8 3762.8 3780.9 3803 
1997 3818.9 3829.9 3845.1 3862.5 3871.3 3889.1 3906.6 3936.3 3957.1 3974.8 3995.1 4015.1 
1998 4038.7 4066 4096.5 4123.6 4143 4166.5 4186.2 4209.7 4249 4284.1 4325.1 4354.5 
1999 4379.4 4404.1 4411.9 4441.8 4462.8 4486.4 4511.1 4529.8 4545.5 4565.7 4588.1 4613.7 
2000 4644.3 4658.3 4685.1 4742.4 4733.8 4749.6 4767 4794.2 4828.5 4847.7 4856.8 4894.2 
2001 4949.2 4987.3 5041.5 5107.9 5105.7 5145.6 5176.4 5209.9 5312.9 5308.8 5348.5 5402 
2002 5424.2 5453.4 5466.6 5468.1 5492.1 5509.4 5553.4 5598.7 5623.4 5665.9 5714.7 5740 
2003 5771.2 5805.8 5827.9 5863 5925.8 5960.6 6006.3 6068.7 6046.3 6033 6034.9 6037.1 
2004 6039.9 6077.7 6115.4 6152.9 6234.3 6240.2 6250.6 6277.5 6313.2 6336 6368.8 6390.6 
2005 6392.2 6403.4 6412.2 6424.2 6441.9 6474.4 6500.5 6538.6 6571.7 6606.4 6625 6649.1 
2006 6690.8 6718.4 6733.9 6765.1 6778.1 6811.6 6854.7 6885.7 6910.4 6958 6995.6 7034.2 
2007 7077.3 7095.8 7121.1 7198.8 7216.9 7245 7278.7 7352.1 7375 7386.5 7410.5 7443.8 
2008 7473.4 7559.1 7629.4 7677.8 7684.7 7705.3 7748.9 7764.8 7818.5 7936.7 7968.3 8146.3 
2009 8246.2 8276.2 8343.7 8349.3 8401.8 8414.6 8415.6 8414.7 8409.7 8431.8 8466.7 8472.8 
2010 8425 8478.1 8482 8509.1 8564.7 8583.5 8580.8 8632.6 8656.6 8702 8731.7 8769.3 
2011 8805.6 8862.1 8904.1 8959.3 9019.7 9084.5 9243.9 9481.4 9503.1 9535.1 9580.9 9610.2 
2012 9706.1 9760.6 9797.4 9857 9888 9940.1 
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 This shows the average monthly amount of M2 in billions of dollars. 
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Chart 3: Aggregate Gold Data 1985-2013 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1985 302.74 299.1 304.17 324.74 316.64 316.83 317.38 329.33 324.25 325.93 325.22 320.81 
1986 345.38 338.89 345.71 340.44 342.56 342.57 348.54 376.6 417.73 423.51 398.81 391.23 
1987 408.26 401.12 408.91 438.35 460.23 449.59 450.52 461.15 460.2 465.36 467.57 486.31 
1988 476.58 442.07 443.61 451.55 451.01 451.33 437.63 431.31 412.79 406.78 420.17 418.49 
1989 404.01 387.78 390.15 384.06 371 367.6 375.04 365.37 361.75 366.88 394.26 409.39 
1990 410.11 416.83 393.07 374.27 369.19 352.33 362.53 394.73 388.41 380.74 381.73 378.16 
1991 383.64 363.83 363.33 358.39 356.82 366.72 367.68 356.23 348.74 358.69 360.17 361.06 
1992 354.45 353.89 344.35 338.5 337.23 340.8 353.05 342.96 345.55 344.38 335.87 334.8 
1993 329.01 329.35 330.08 342.07 367.18 371.89 392.19 378.84 355.27 364.18 373.83 383.35 
1994 386.88 381.91 384.13 377.27 381.26 385.64 385.49 380.35 391.58 389.77 384.39 379.29 
1995 378.55 376.64 382.12 391.03 385.12 387.56 386.23 383.81 383.05 383.14 385.3 387.44 
1996 400.27 404.79 396.25 392.83 391.86 385.27 383.47 387.46 383.14 381.07 377.85 369 
1997 354.11 346.58 351.81 344.47 343.97 340.76 324.1 324.01 322.82 324.87 306.04 288.74 
1998 289.15 297.49 295.94 308.29 299.1 292.32 292.87 284.11 288.98 296.22 294.77 291.62 
1999 287.07 287.22 285.96 282.62 276.88 261.37 256.08 256.7 266.6 310.72 293.18 283.34 
2000 284.32 299.94 286.39 279.86 275.31 285.73 281.55 274.47 273.68 270 266.01 271.45 
2001 265.49 261.86 263.06 260.48 272.35 270.23 267.53 272.39 283.42 283.06 276.16 275.85 
2002 281.65 295.5 294.05 302.68 314.49 321.18 313.29 310.25 319.16 316.56 319.15 332.43 
2003 356.86 358.97 340.55 328.18 355.68 356.53 351.02 359.77 378.95 378.92 389.91 407.59 
2004 413.99 405.33 406.67 403.02 383.45 391.99 398.09 400.48 405.27 420.46 439.39 441.76 
2005 424.15 423.35 434.24 428.93 421.87 430.66 424.48 437.93 456.04 469.9 476.67 509.76 
2006 549.86 565 557.09 610.65 676.51 596.15 633.17 632.59 598.19 585.78 627.83 629.79 
2007 631.17 664.75 654.9 679.37 666.86 655.49 665.3 665.41 712.65 754.6 806.25 803.2 
2008 889.6 922.3 968.43 909.7 888.66 889.49 939.77 839.02 829.93 806.62 760.86 816.09 
2009 858.69 943.16 924.27 890.66 928.64 945.67 934.23 949.38 996.59 
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Monthly price of Gold in dollars per ounce. 
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Chart 4: Aggregate Oil Data 1985-2013 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1985 25.6 27.3 28.2 28.8 27.6 27.1 27.3 27.8 28.3 29.5 30.8 27.2 
1986 22.9 15.4 12.6 12.8 15.4 13.5 11.6 15.1 14.9 14.9 15.2 16.1 
1987 18.7 17.7 18.3 18.6 19.4 20 21.4 20.3 19.5 19.8 18.9 17.2 
1988 17.2 16.8 16.2 17.9 17.4 16.5 15.5 15.5 14.5 13.8 14 16.3 
1989 18 17.8 19.4 21 20 20 19.6 18.5 19.6 20.1 19.8 21.1 
1990 22.6 22.1 20.4 18.6 18.2 16.9 18.6 27.2 33.7 35.9 32.3 27.3 
1991 25 20.5 19.9 20.8 21.2 20.2 21.4 21.7 21.9 23.2 22.5 19.5 
1992 18.8 19 18.9 20.2 20.9 22.4 21.8 21.4 21.9 21.7 20.3 19.4 
1993 19.1 20.1 20.3 20.3 19.9 19.1 17.9 18 17.5 18.1 16.7 14.5 
1994 15 14.8 14.7 16.4 17.9 19.1 19.7 18.4 17.5 17.7 18.1 17.2 
1995 18 18.5 18.6 19.9 19.7 18.4 17.3 18 18.2 17.4 18 19 
1996 18.9 19.1 21.4 23.6 21.3 20.5 21.3 22 24 24.9 23.7 25.4 
1997 25.2 22.2 21 19.7 20.8 19.2 19.6 19.9 19.8 21.3 20.2 18.3 
1998 16.7 16.1 15 15.4 14.9 13.7 14.1 13.4 15 14.4 12.9 11.3 
1999 12.5 12 14.7 17.3 17.8 17.9 20.1 21.3 23.9 22.6 25 26.1 
2000 27.2 29.4 29.9 25.7 28.8 31.8 29.8 31.2 33.9 33.1 34.4 28.5 
2001 29.6 29.6 27.2 27.4 28.6 27.6 26.5 27.5 25.9 22.2 19.7 19.3 
2002 19.7 20.7 24.4 26.3 27 25.5 26.9 28.4 29.7 28.9 26.3 29.4 
2003 32.9 35.9 33.6 28.3 28.1 30.7 30.8 31.6 28.3 30.3 31.1 32.2 
2004 34.3 34.7 36.8 36.7 40.3 38 40.7 44.9 46 53.1 48.5 43.3 
2005 46.8 48 54.3 53 49.8 56.3 58.7 65 65.6 62.4 58.3 59.4 
2006 65.5 61.6 62.9 69.7 70.9 71 74.4 73.1 63.9 58.9 59.4 62 
2007 54.6 59.3 60.6 64 63.5 67.5 74.2 72.4 79.9 86.2 94.6 91.7 
2008 93 95.4 105.6 112.6 125.4 133.9 133.4 116.6 103.9 76.7 57.4 41 
2009 41.7 39.1 47.9 49.7 59.1 69.6 64 71 69.4 75.8 78 74.3 
2010 78.2 76.4 81.2 84.4 73.8 75.3 76.3 76.8 75.3 81.9 84.1 89 
2011 89.4 89.5 102.9 110 101.3 96.2 97.1 86.3 85.6 86.4 97.2 98.5 
2012 100.2 102.2 106.1 103.3 94.7 82 87.9 94.2 94.7 89.6 88.6 88.3 
2013 95.33 94.19 93.05 92.07 94.8 95.8 104.6 106.6 106.2 100.5 93.8 97.6 
 
Monthly price of Oil in dollars per barrel. 
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Chart 5: Aggregate Wheat Data 1985 thru 2013 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1985 147.57 140.5 140.88 139.14 122.65 123.15 117.77 111.81 111.19 121.03 131.65 136.58 
1986 135.4 136.06 139.48 139.67 119.2 99.61 100.09 100.26 102.29 114.79 118.13 115.69 
1987 117.44 115.67 116.53 113.1 115.83 102.15 100.6 101.74 110.1 113.46 113.72 124.88 
1988 126.17 125.25 118.2 122.91 124.42 139.63 138.94 145.87 153.26 162.87 162.29 168.86 
1989 172.56 164.24 168.58 161.35 162.64 151.9 152.39 153.37 157.26 160.48 163.92 166.45 
1990 163 155.52 153.26 150.69 133.49 130.49 119.55 115.12 108.46 104.77 106.37 108.35 
1991 107.07 106.37 116.16 117.05 115.63 118.18 116.23 127.06 137.56 147.2 147.04 157.81 
1992 167.26 170.12 161.44 153.07 139.72 140.36 129.93 118.8 131.47 137.42 145.84 146.27 
1993 156.92 149.43 145.46 156.34 140.09 112.25 116.77 119.55 115.71 127.87 136.41 140.49 
1994 152.71 144.19 133.49 129.98 125.25 120.15 119.51 128.15 142.12 157.38 152.39 157.34 
1995 152.99 149.71 143.08 140.68 143.28 153.48 173.36 168.47 185.61 194.04 198.27 205.33 
1996 196.98 203.96 205.51 247.52 213.43 180.6 181.08 174.99 169.71 158.44 158.21 158.6 
1997 154.01 143.58 153.8 158.62 152.65 131.59 127.78 140.91 143.22 143.65 138.23 135.74 
1998 130.21 127.32 129.85 118.33 112.29 107.18 96.78 92.85 96.34 107.64 115.28 104.11 
1999 103.18 94.96 100.24 99.65 96.59 92.94 85.3 92.78 102.06 98.67 96.91 92.06 
2000 98.56 100.06 97.19 95.19 104.28 99.28 91.17 90.87 97.88 104.33 103.21 104.95 
2001 110.37 106.74 103.49 101.09 102.55 97.42 107.98 105.91 107.57 115.01 116.36 118.2 
2002 121.68 113.38 116.62 112.99 110.91 115.44 123.5 130.05 151.84 156.82 160.02 146.24 
2003 137.53 140.77 129.36 125.8 129.15 126.28 128.95 144.17 138.36 142.82 160.94 158.77 
2004 155.89 157.49 156.51 157.24 148.31 137.21 131.63 129.13 138.19 141.44 140.82 139.46 
2005 142.47 141.62 152.16 132.14 133.13 131.06 130.85 131.77 128.24 135.26 132.35 137.59 
2006 144.16 149.25 142.66 140.82 150.92 140.14 143.85 148.36 166.89 197.77 192.94 189.85 
2007 175.98 176.46 168.54 175.27 180.78 205.03 225.61 253.9 322.98 325.55 307.65 345.31 
2008 343.81 388.75 419.61 323.43 255.1 254.74 245.45 255.37 223.77 185.92 182.98 179.31 
2009 195.11 183.35 183.72 182.62 202.46 201.72 175.63 161.67 158.37 175.63 204.66 206.5 
2010 198.78 191.8 189.96 187.76 190.33 182.62 222.28 261.61 276.31 267.49 278.52 308.65 
2011 320.4 338.78 303.14 314.89 308.65 282.19 266.39 277.62 267.49 253.53 253.16 244.71 
2012 253.9 263.08 259.78 254.63 251.33 249.49 322.98 333.73 343.55 340.25 346.49 325.18 
2013 309.01 297.99 285.87 278.15 279.25 268.23 260.88 252.43 259.8 287.72 274.43 267.05 
 
Monthly price of Wheat in dollars per metric ton. 
